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CASES NOTED
by holding them liable for a failure to provide necessaries 12 and for the in-
fliction of unreasonable punishment.13
The court in the instant case recognized that radical social and economic
changes justify a departure from the general rule when the parent is acting
in a business or vocational capacity. a4 The rationale underlying the general
rule was criticized on the ground that the aforementioned objections are
applicable to property actions between parent and child which have always
been allowed. 15 It was also expressly stated that the presence of liability
insurance should be disregarded since it has no effect upon the merits of
the case.'
With this decision another inroad has been made into the general rule.
Heretofore the parent has been held liable in his dual capacity only when
protected by liability insurance. While the case furthers the present trend
and reaches an equitable result the court seems to apply an artificial rule
that may be difficult to administer since no standards are specified for deter-
mining when a parent is acting in a business or vocational capacity. The
decision also leaves undecided the question whether the rule is to be exclu-
sive in its application and thus bar redress for willful and malicious torts.
It is unfortunate that the court did not differentiate between duties grow-
ing out of the parental relation and those owed to the world in general and
base their recovery upon such fact rather than on the nebulous concept of
dual capacity. A more workable rule would be to grant immunity only when
the parent is reasonably discharging a parental duty.
EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF - BURDEN OF GOING
FORWARD
Defendant, driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor, struck deceased who died immediately. Defendant was
charged with involuntary manslaughter.' Held, that when a wound from
which death might ensue has been inflicted and thereafter death occurs,
the burden of proof is upon accused to make it appear that death did not
result from the wound but from some other cause, Hopper v. State, 54
So.2d 165 (Fla. 1951).
The general rule is that the state, in a criminal case, must prove by
competent evidence every essential element of the crime beyond and to
12. Foley v. Foley, 61 II1. App. 577 (1895) (medical care); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69
Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903) (food and clothing).
13. Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925).
14. Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ohio 1952).
15. Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128
At. 29 (1925); Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.11. 241, 56 Atl. 190 (1903); Lamb v. Lamb,
146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
16. Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ohio 1952).
1. FLA. STAT. § 860.01 (1951).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.2 In a homicide case the prosecution
must prove the corpus delicti and that the accused is the perpetrator.8 The
corpus delicti consists of the fact of death, criminal agency of another per-
son' and the identification of the deceased person.5  The presumption is
that a person is innocent until proven guilty and it is for the state to remove
and overcome this presumption by proof.0 In a civil case presumptions may
sometimes fix the burden of proof. In a criminal case, generally neither
the burden of proof7 nor the burden of proceeding with any evidences can
be imposed upon the accused.
A person is held to intend the ordinary add natural consequences of his
wrongful acts;3 therefore, when a person has maliciously inflicted a wound
resulting in death the crime is murder even though another agency, such as
ill treatment or neglect, has contributed to the death.' 0 The accused, in
order to mitigate the crime, must show that the person died solely from the
other cause.1" However, this rule does not relieve the state from its burden
of proving that death resulted from the wound.1 2 \ When the state has shown
existence through the act of the accused of a sufficient cause of death, death
is presumed to have resulted from such act, unless the defendant can reason-
ably show another cause of death. 13 Death may be presumed to have been
caused by apparent wounds, especially where there is no suggestion that de-
ceased dies from any cause other than that relied on by the state.2 4  If in
a murder case the prosecution proves the killing, or the defendant admits it,
the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation or justification rests upon
the accused,'" unless such appears froh the evidence introduced by the
state.
Reasonably construed, the rule should be applied only to a charge of
2. Gorden v. State, 86 Fla. 255, 97 So. 428 (1923).
3. Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1945); Jones v. State, 220 Ind.
384, 43 N.E.2d 1017 (1942).
4. Gacket v. State, 23 Ala. App. 313, 124 So. 670 (1929); State v. Johnson, 193
N.C. 701, 138 S.E. 19 (1927).
5. Lee v. State, 96 Fla. 59, 117 So. 699 (1928).
6. 2 WARREN, 1-oMICIDE § 1S3 (Perm. ed, 1938).
7. Ezzard v. United States, 7 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1925).
8. State v. Lapointe, 81 N.H. 227, 123 Atl. 692 (1924).
9. 3 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 139 (16th ed. 1899).
10. State v. Scott, 12 La. An. 274 (1875); WHARTON, HOrmCiD. 241 (1855).
11. Ibid.
12. State v. Scott, 12 La. An. 274 (1875) (before jury can convict defendant it
must believe from the evidence that the deceased died of the wounds inflicted by the
accused and from no other cause).
13. United States v. Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas. 727, No. 16,738 (E.D. Pa. 1819);
People v. Meyers, 392 I11. 355, 64 N.E.2d. 531 (1946); State v. Briscoe, 30 La. An. 433
(1878). Contra: State v. Redman, 217 N.C. 483, 8 S.E.2d 623 (1940).
14. Franklin v. State, 180 Tenn. 41, 171 S.W.2d 281 (1943).
15. Bellamy v. State, 56 Fla. 43, 47 So. 868 (1908); Bass v. Commonwealth, 296
Ky. 426, 177 S.W.2d 386 (1944); State v. Briscoe, 30 La. An. 433 (1878). Contra
State v. Johnson, 223 Ind, 962, 274 N.W. 41 (1937).
16. Parker v. State, 197 Ga. 340, 29 S.E.2d 61 (1944).
CASES NOTED
murder' 7 to which the defendant has interposed the defense that an act
other than his own caused the death.' 8 This rule has no application until
the state has proven a sufficient cause of death. 19  The rule of law that
once the state has shown a sufficient cause of death, a rebuttable presump-
tion arises, 20 should mean only that the defendant has the burden of going
forward with the evidence.
In the instant case, defendant was charged with involuntary man-
slaughter and did not contend that death was due to any cause other than
that alleged by the state. Therefore, it is submitted that the rule, since it is
applicable for mitigating purposes only, was wrongfully applied to the instant
case. If the court meant to imply that the state had sufficiently proven the
cause of death to raise a presumption, the words "burden of proof" should
not have been used. Since from the record it appears that the state suffi-
ciently proved the death by competent evidence, the use of the rule was
superfluous.
EVIDENCE-REFUSAL OF FEDERAL COURT TO ENJOIN ADMIS-
SION OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN STATE COURT
Plaintiff was indicted for bookmaking in violation of a New Jersey
statute.' He sought an injunction' in a United States district court to
restrain the prosecutor from using illegally obtained evidence in the state
criminal proceeding. Held, on certiorari, that federal courts should refuse
to intervene in state proceedings to suppress the use of evidence, even when
claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure. Stefanelli v.
Minard, 72 Sup. Ct. 118 (1951).
Prior to 1914, it was generally recognized that in a criminal proceeding
any court would receive evidence, whether legally or illegally obtained,3 if
otherwise competent. The courts rationalized that to hold otherwise would
involve the raising of collateral issues.4 In Weeks v. United States5 how-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction which was based on evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search by a United States marshal. The Court
17. Until the instant case, the words "with murderous intent" were included in the
rule. E,g,, Bellamy v. State, 56 Fla. 43, 57 So. 868 (1908); State v. Briscoe, 30 La.
An. 433 (1878).
18. State v. Briscoe, 30 La. An. 433 (1878).
19. Ibid.
20. United States v. Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas. 727, No. 16,738 (E.D. Pa. 1819).
1. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:135-3 (1939).
2. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1946).
3. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met.
329, 337 (Mass. 1841); People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351 (1903); Bishop Atterbury's
Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 495 (1723); 3 WICoRE', EVIDENCE §§ 2183, 2264 (3d ed.1940).4. See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (appeals from "final deci-
sions of the district courts"7 .
5. 232 U.S. 383 (194).
